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Abstract 
The thesis that nothing is true has long been thought to be a self-refuting position 
not worthy of serious philosophical consideration. Recently, however, the thesis of 
alethic nihilism—that nothing is true—has been explicitly defended (notably by 
David Liggins). Nihilism is also, I argue, a consequence of other views about truth 
that have recently been advocated, such as fictionalism about truth and the 
inconsistency account. After offering an account of alethic nihilism, and how it 
purports to avoid the self-refutation problem, I argue that it avoids the problem at 
the expense of changing the subject. I then present other arguments against 
nihilism and responses to the considerations offered in defense of it. The only 
tenable position is that something is indeed true. 
 
Introduction 
My aim in this paper is to establish that something is true. Some readers, at least by the 
end of this sentence, will have concluded that my task is accomplished. Although I would be happy 
to have a paper join the ranks of philosophy’s delightfully pithy essays (e.g., Lycan 1984 and 
Goldschmidt 2016), my project here is more substantive. There are a number of contemporary 
philosophers who either defend or are committed to the claim that nothing is true, and it is against 
them that I am arguing. The thesis that there is no truth may instantly call to mind postmodernist 
views or radical interpretations of Nietzsche. But that’s not the intellectual space that frames and 
inspires the views of the contemporary alethic nihilists who deny (or are committed to denying) the 
existence of truth. Their motivation is largely derived from concerns over the alethic paradoxes 
such as the Liar (i.e., the fact that ‘This very sentence is false’ appears to be true if and only if it is 
false). Nevertheless, I suspect that the contemporary paradox-driven nihilists maintain a position 




I begin by identifying the alethic nihilist position, its adherents, and its motivations. 
Because many have taken the view to be self-refuting, I then address the nihilist’s argument for 
why the view is self-consistent. I then argue that it earns consistency only at the expense of 
changing the subject. Then I challenge the arguments that have been offered in support of nihilism, 
and offer my own objections. Ultimately, the only tenable position in the philosophy of truth is 
that something is true. 
 
1 Alethic nihilism and its motivations 
1.1 Alethic nihilism and nihilists 
There are several more-or-less equivalent ways of articulating alethic nihilism. Perhaps the 
most straightforward is to define it as the view that nothing is true.1 Alternatively, truth doesn’t 
exist. Alternatively, truths don’t exist. Alternatively, there is no property of truth—even in the 
“merely abundant” or deflated sense of ‘property’.2 Whether these formulations are adequate or 
equivalent turns on other background philosophical views: consider a nominalist who denies the 
existence of properties across the board, or a mereological nihilist who believes only in the 
existence of sub-atomic particles and so not any truth-bearers. I doubt there is a definitive and 
unambiguous way of stating the view I aim to challenge in a way that begs no question whatsoever. 
In general, stating a definition for a philosophical theory is bound to face counterexamples and 
invoke (what are, according to at least someone’s view) problematic or contentious 
presuppositions. So it goes. 
Identifying one’s actual interlocutors is usually more straightforward.3 The philosophical 
landscape relevant to alethic nihilism includes three major camps. First there is Liggins, who is the 
major champion for alethic nihilism (2014, 2019). Because it is Liggins who is the primary defender 
of the view, much of my criticism below engages with him in particular. Liggins argues that alethic 
nihilism offers a non-ad hoc and revenge-immune solution to the liar paradox. A simple 
presentation of the liar paradox is as follows: 
 
                                                 
1 E.g., Grim & Rescher 2012: 60, Liggins 2014: 571 and 2019: 10, and Armour-Garb & Woodbridge 2017: 3090. 
2 E.g., Kroon 2019: 106. Scharp (2013: 263, 2021) commits to this view, but denies that it entails that nothing is true. 
I challenge that denial below. Many deflationists about truth have been saddled with the denial that there is a property 
of truth (see, e.g., Kirkham 1992: 307), but they are best interpreted as denying that there is a substantive property of 
truth, which is consistent with there being a deflated property of truth. See Edwards 2013 and Asay 2014, and Lewis 
1983 for the distinction between sparse and abundant properties. 
3 One case I’m not sure about is the expressivist view trialed by Schroeder 2010. It treats ‘true’ as a “non-descriptive 




(1) (L) = ‘(L) is not true’ 
(2) ‘(L) is not true’ is true if and only if (L) is not true. 
(3) (L) is true if and only if (L) is not true. 
 
Step (1) defines a liar sentence. Step (2) is the instance of the T-schema corresponding to (L). 
Contradictory (3) immediately follows from (2) by the substitution allowed by the identity in (1). 
Liggins believes that attempts to show that liar sentences are meaningless or non-existent are ad 
hoc. Liggins instead rejects (2), and thereby blocks the inference to (3) without having to deny any 
tenet of classical logic. Liggins accepts that (L) is not true: nothing is. But he rejects that ‘(L) is not 
true’ is true (nothing is). Thus, because Liggins rejects its left-hand side and accepts its right-hand 
side, he rejects (2), the instance of the T-schema corresponding to (L). The nihilist thus has an 
explanation for why (2) is to be rejected, and thus why the liar argument is unsound. 
Note that Liggins doesn’t deny everything by way of denying that anything is true. It’s not 
true that snow is white, but that doesn’t mean, for the nihilist, that snow isn’t white. With respect 
to “grounded” claims that don’t predicate truth, the nihilist carries on as before, alongside everyone 
else. Snow is white, and grass isn’t purple. What they refuse to do is semantically ascend, and 
attribute truth to the claims they are willing to assert.4 
The second major camp committed to alethic nihilism is fictionalism aimed specifically at 
discourse involving ‘true’ and truth. According to this view, “We talk as if there is a property of 
truth, but there is no reason to think that truth has anything beyond this ‘as if’ status” (Beall 2004: 
210). Such forms of fictionalism are aimed only at predications of truth; they do not suppose that 
the content to which truth is predicated is also to be handled fictionally. Fictionalists tend to lead 
with their view about how ‘true’ operates in a fictional context, not with the commitment to 
nothing being true. But that commitment is presumably there; if truth isn’t imaginary in the first 
place, there’s no reason to pretend when talking about it. Regardless of the kind of fictionalism at 
issue, it is standard practice to distinguish between hermeneutic fictionalists and revolutionary 
fictionalists (Burgess & Rosen 1997: 6). Hermeneutic fictionalists about truth maintain that alethic 
discourse is already operating in fictional mode (e.g., Beall 2004, Woodbridge 2005, Armour-Garb 
& Woodbridge 2010, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017). Revolutionary fictionalists about truth (e.g., Kroon 
2019; see also Burgess & Burgess 2011: 129-131) argue that a discourse ought to operate in that 
mode. Strictly speaking, fictionalism of either variety is consistent with the existence of truth. One 
might think that although our alethic discourse operates under a guise of pretense, it doesn’t have 
                                                 




to because truth is real; or one might think that even though truth is real, we should pretend it 
isn’t. Actual fictionalists about truth, however, are committed to alethic nihilism. It’s hard to see 
how to motivate their fictionalism otherwise. 
Finally there are the inconsistency theorists, who believe that TRUTH5 is an inconsistent 
concept. Inconsistency theorists hold that a concept like TRUTH is inconsistent because reasoning 
in accordance with it leads one to draw false or contradictory inferences. Mainly whom I have in 
mind here are theorists like Eklund (2007, 2014) and Scharp (e.g., 2013, 2021), who are leading 
defenders of TRUTH being inconsistent. But at least some of the theorists I’ve canvassed already 
also believe that TRUTH is inconsistent (e.g., Kroon 2019). What distinguishes Eklund and Scharp 
for my purposes is that they don’t think the inconsistency view leads to nihilism.6 So it will be 
worthwhile to pause to show how any inconsistency theorist is committed to alethic nihilism, 
despite their protests to the contrary.7 
Consider Scharp’s own example of an inconsistent concept: RABLE. On Scharp’s view, 
concepts have constitutive principles that provide the meaning for the words that express that 
concept. The word ‘rable’ is made meaningful by Scharp because he defines RABLE’s constitutive 
principles as follows (2013: 36): 
 
‘rable’ applies to x if x is a table. 
‘rable’ disapplies to x if x is a red thing. 
 
The concept RABLE is inconsistent because its constitutive principles falsely entail that the red 
tables in the furniture shop don’t exist. But here’s the relevant metaphysical question, which Scharp 
never addresses: are there any rables? Let’s assume that there is a consistent answer to this question. 
(Alethic nihilism is, after all, an alternative to dialetheism, and all parties to the current discussion 
are aiming for a consistent worldview.) To be a rable is to be the sort of thing that has the property 
that matches RABLE. What else could a rable be than something that satisfies the rules associated 
with RABLE? So suppose there are rables. What are they? One answer is that the rables are just the 
tables, including the red ones. This answer respects the first constitutive principle at the expense 
                                                 
5 Small caps denote concepts. 
6 See, e.g., Eklund 2007: 570-571 and 2014: 301-302 and Scharp 2013: 241 and 2021: S672-S673. 
7 By comparison, Azzouni (2003) argues that natural languages like English are inconsistent, and consequently that every 
sentence of such languages is both true and false. Patterson (2009) offers the view that natural languages are 
inconsistent, and consequently full of meaningless sentences that are neither true nor false. But that leaves the door 




of the second, which tells us that the red tables aren’t rables. A second answer is that the rables 
are the non-red tables. This answer respects the second constitutive principle at the expense of the 
first, which tells us that red tables are rables. The only way of respecting both principles is to 
conclude that the red tables both are and aren’t rables, which is the inconsistent option off the 
(proverbial) table. Choosing one of these answers over the other is ad hoc: there is no tie-breaker 
on offer between them. Furthermore, both answers effectively reduce rablehood to either 
tablehood or non-red tablehood, and, ex hypothesi, that’s not what it is to be a rable. So there is no 
principled stance according to which there are rables, precisely because of the inconsistency 
inherent to RABLE. There is a principled stance according to which there are no rables, however. 
That is the view that there is no property of being a rable, and so nothing is a rable. There’s just 
no way a thing could be such that it ends up being a rable. After all, RABLE is an inconsistent 
concept, and here we are seeing the metaphysical fallout of a concept being inconsistent. If some 
concept is inconsistent, then there is nothing in the world that corresponds to it. Inconsistent 
concepts have empty extensions. 
If TRUTH is inconsistent, then a parallel argument shows that it, too, is empty. If there is a 
property of truth, such that something is true, then it must be the property that corresponds to 
TRUTH’s constitutive principles. For Scharp, those principles are the ones invoked by the T-
schema: ‘p’ is true if p, and if p, then ‘p’ is true. If that’s how the property of truth works, then (L) 
both has and lacks it. That’s impossible, so there is no property of truth. So if TRUTH is 
inconsistent, nothing is true. 
Scharp goes so far as denying that there is a property of truth, but not that things are true. 
But if there is no property of truth, then being true is not a way that things are.8 And if things aren’t 
true, then things aren’t true. To say otherwise is to maintain, for example, that ‘Snow is white’ is true, 
despite the fact that being true is not a way that ‘Snow is white’ can be. Note that Scharp is not 
saying what, say, prosententialists have said (e.g., Grover 1992). He doesn’t deny that truth is a 
property because doing so mistakenly treats ‘true’ as grammatically a predicate when really it’s a 
prosentence-forming operator. Scharp is abundantly clear that consistent alethic concepts (that is, 
concepts that formally resemble TRUTH but shed its problematic constitutive principles) do 
correspond to properties (though they would be as deserving of a prosententialist treatment as 
TRUTH is). He writes: “I shall argue that there is no property of being true because no property comes 
close enough to satisfying the platitudes for truth” (2021: S650). The nature of TRUTH (and so the 
                                                 




meaning of ‘true’), not the grammatical nature of ‘true’, is responsible for the non-existence of the 
property truth. 
 
1.2 Motivating alethic nihilism 
The view that nothing is true is, to put it lightly, contentious. The main theoretical impetus 
behind the view involves its resources for responding to the liar paradox. The basic reasoning goes 
as follows. Given the concept that it is, TRUTH just is that concept that endorses unrestricted 
application of the following principle: 
 
(T) For all x and p, if x means that p then x is true if and only if p.9 
 
Reasoning in line with this principle is usually anodyne and unobjectionable. But given that the 
sentence (L) means that (L) is not true, the schema yields the contradictory: 
 
 (L) is true if and only if (L) is not true. 
 
Thus, a seemingly innocuous ordinary principle like (T) together with the fact that (L) is stipulated 
to mean what it does leads to a contradiction. 
Liggins responds to the paradox by demonstrating how the alethic nihilist may avoid it. 
The nihilist maintains that nothing is true. Hence, they will reject (T). (T) entails that ‘Penguins 
predate puffins’ is true, given that ‘Penguins predate puffins’ means that penguins predate puffins, 
and that penguins predate puffins. The nihilist agrees that ‘Penguins predate puffins’ means that 
penguins predate puffins, and they agree that penguins predate puffins. (To be a skeptic about the 
existence of things being true is not to be a skeptic about semantics or evolution or anything else.) 
But they don’t think anything is true, so they reject (T). 
Nihilists, then, are not beholden to the T-schema. Consider the instance of the schema 
corresponding to (L): 
 
‘(L) is not true’ is true if and only if (L) is not true. 
 
The nihilist rejects the left-hand side, as it claims, incorrectly in their view, that something is true. 
But the nihilist accepts the right-hand side, as it correctly assesses (L)’s not being true: nothing is, 
                                                 
9 Note that while the quantifier binding ‘x’ is objectual and nominal, it’s contentious what is binding ‘p’. On Liggins’s 




for the nihilist. Since the nihilist accepts one side of the biconditional but not the other, they reject 
the biconditional itself. But without this biconditional, the paradox is blocked. Yes, (L) is not true, 
and (L) means that (L) is not true. Isn’t (L) true then after all? No, says the nihilist: to say otherwise 
is to presuppose the T-sentence in question, which the nihilist has grounds for rejecting. 
The nihilist offers a unique perspective on the T-schema. Half of its instances are 
acceptable, and half are not. (None, of course, is true.) The acceptable ones involve unacceptable 
right-hand sides. For example: 
 
‘Dolphins demand diamonds’ is true if and only if dolphins demand diamonds. 
 
Dolphins don’t demand diamonds, and the sentence isn’t true, so this biconditional is acceptable. 
Unacceptable T-biconditionals are those with acceptable right-hand sides, such as: 
 
‘Dolphins don’t demand diamonds’ is true if and only if dolphins don’t demand diamonds. 
 
Dolphins don’t demand diamonds, but the sentence that says as much isn’t true. So this T-
biconditional is to be rejected. 
Liggins’s attitude is that the alethic nihilist, in virtue of their nihilism, has a principled stance 
on the T-biconditionals, and thus a principled response to the liar paradox. Other views “restrict” 
the T-schema solely to avoid the paradox, whereas alethic nihilism comes with such restrictions 
“built in”. (I return to this dialectic below, in section 3.3.) 
Hence, alethic nihilism’s motivation is primarily logical rather than metaphysical.10 By 
contrast, consider the sort of nihilism one finds in Nietzsche’s early unpublished essay “On Truth 
and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” (1979). There, Nietzsche argues that no belief any of us could 
possibly have is true. Any belief we form is a product of the concepts we possess, and those 
concepts are irredeemably anthropocentric; because they are our concepts, they cannot claim to 
describe reality as it is in itself. For a belief to be true it must be formed in terms of those concepts 
                                                 
10 Note that this motivation separates alethic nihilism from other error-theoretic views. Field’s error theory about 
numbers (1980), Mackie’s about ethics (1977), and Appiah’s (1992) and Zack’s (1993) about race all have ontological 
motivations. Roughly speaking, because the entities or properties needed to make true our discourse about these topics 
don’t exist, the claims in question systematically fail to be true. That motivation is lacking for alethic nihilism, since 
nihilists accept what others take to be sufficient grounds for the existence of truth. Ontological concerns about the 
property of truth typically lead to deflationism about it, not nihilism. Armour-Garb and Woodbridge at times motivate 





that capture reality as it is, concepts which are forever inaccessible to us. So Nietzsche offers a 
radical brand of Kantianism: he agrees with the Kantian that facts about the noumena are in principle 
unknowable (and even unthinkable), and goes further by finding no room for truth with respect 
to phenomena. Unlike the contemporary nihilist, the early Nietzsche is committed to there being 
truths, although those truths are in principle cognitively inaccessible. But for all those thoughts 
that we can in principle think, the early Nietzsche agrees with the contemporary nihilist that none 
of them is true. The major difference with contemporary nihilism is that Nietzsche must deny all 
claims (including claims that negate one another), whether or not they are semantically ascended. 
Not only is ‘Snow is white’ not true, but snow isn’t white, either. By avoiding this “omnidenialism”, 
the contemporary nihilist can advocate a consistent and more sensible view. 
Liggins offers some other considerations in favor of nihilism, beyond its response to the 
liar paradox. Those include its relative ontological simplicity and epistemological advantages. I 
question both of those supposed benefits below. Now I turn to the nihilist’s response to the 
problem of self-refutation. I argue that the nihilist avoids the objection only at the cost of changing 
the subject. 
 
2 Self-refutation and changing the subject 
The idea that alethic nihilism is self-refuting has a long pedigree. Sextus Empiricus presents 
the basic argument concisely: “For if all appearances are false and nothing is true, “Nothing is 
true” is true. If nothing is true, therefore, there is a true thing. And so Xeniades, in saying that all 
appearances are false and that nothing at all in the things that are is true, has been brought round 
to the opposite of his thesis” (2005: 79; see also 99). The nihilist puts forward a claim: that nothing 
is true. But in so doing, they put forward a truth: that nothing is true. After all, in asserting a claim 
one is presenting it as being true. So the nihilist position amounts to the self-contradictory thesis 
that while nothing is true, something is true (namely, the thesis that nothing is true).11 
The argument turns on the transition from a claim that p to the claim that it’s true that p, 
on what Charron and Doyle call “the necessary prefixability of the operator “it is true that”” (1993: 
242). The acceptability of inferences between ‘p’ and ‘It’s true that p’ is so widespread that it’s no 
challenge to find contemporary authors who accept the self-refutation argument.12 This inference 
                                                 
11 Medieval philosophers made great use of this argument as well. See Augustine 1910: 95, and references to Anselm, 
Bonaventure, and Aquinas in Charron & Doyle 1993. These same philosophers (save for Aquinas) took the argument 
for the necessity of there being truth to further be an argument for the existence of God. 
12 See, e.g., Mackie 1964: 195, Priest 1995: 56-58, Grim & Rescher 2012: 60-62, and Scharp 2021: S672-673. The 




is precisely what nihilists like Liggins challenge; assuming it within the self-refutation argument is 
thus question-begging (David 1994: 60, Liggins 2019: 14).13 
As we have seen, the nihilist regards the inferences between ‘p’ and ‘‘p’ is true’ as invalid. 
The biconditionals ‘‘p’ is true if and only if p’ are acceptable only if ‘p’ is not. Breaking the link 
between a claim and its semantic ascension explains why the nihilist is not an omnidenier who 
denies everything. If asserting that nothing is true requires denying everything, then the assertion 
is self-undermining: in asserting it, one must deny it, too. But the nihilist doesn’t see the rejection 
of truth as a rejection of everything. Snow is still white, even though ‘Snow is white’ isn’t true. And 
though ‘Snow is white’ isn’t true, that doesn’t mean that ‘‘Snow is white’ isn’t true’ is true. 
The self-refutation argument can be presented as follows: 
 
(1) Nothing is true. 
(2) If nothing is true, then it’s true that nothing is true. 
(3) If it’s true that nothing is true, then something is true. 
(4) Something is true. 
 
(4) contradicts (1), and so the argument offers a reductio on (1), thereby proving that something is 
true. (1) is the statement of alethic nihilism. (2) is maintained by anyone who unconditionally 
adopts the T-schema, but the nihilist sees no reason to accept it. The nihilist rejects it because they 
affirm its antecedent but reject its consequent. To use (2) against the nihilist is to beg the question 
against their view. 
The nihilist, thus, claims to adopt a self-consistent view. Though they accept that nothing 
is true, they do not grant that it follows that their view, which says precisely that, is itself true. 
However, this internal consistency, obviously vital to the nihilist, comes at the expense of changing 
the subject. That is to say, when the nihilist denies that something is true, they must be denying 
something that their opponent does not recognize. As a result, they cannot be interpreted as having 
denied the existence of truth, but rather something else. Hence, the self-consistency earned is 
nothing but a mirage. 
                                                 
Clark 1990 and Tanesini 1995). Note that Gemes (1992) refers to Nietzsche’s nihilist statements as “paradoxical”, 
which gives them more initial credence than they deserve. 
13 Duns Scotus objects to the self-refutation argument, though not in a way that is useful to contemporary nihilists. 
According to Scotus, what follows from there being no truth is not that there is truth after all, but that nothing exists, 




First, consider the structure that the nihilist’s defense must take. The non-nihilist accepts 
the validity of inferences between two kinds of claims, ‘p’ and ‘q’. The nihilist denies the inference: 
even if it’s the case that p, it doesn’t necessarily follow that q. The nihilist must therefore find a 
“gulf” between the two claims—some logical space for breaking the two apart. (The absence of 
such a gulf between ‘p’ and ‘p’, for instance, explains why reiteration is valid.) In fact the gulf must 
be wider. For the nihilist, the separation between ‘p’ and ‘q’ is not merely logically possible, but 
actual. Moreover, the nihilist infers the negation of ‘q’ from ‘p’. The inferential behavior between the 
two camps couldn’t be more different. What explains the discrepancy is that what the nihilist denies 
in denying ‘q’ is not what the non-nihilist accepts in accepting ‘q’. 
There are different ways of filling in this structure, depending upon how strong the 
equivalence between grounded statements and their alethic counterparts is supposed to be. First, 
one must be careful when it comes to which alethic counterpart is at issue. Compare ‘Penguins 
predate puffins’ against the following: 
 
(A) ‘Penguins predate puffins’ is true. 
(B) The proposition that penguins predate puffins is true. 
(C) It’s true that penguins predate puffins. 
 
The equivalence between ‘Penguins predate puffins’ and (A) appears to be metaphysically 
contingent, in that they are equivalent only because the English sentence ‘Penguins predate puffins’ 
means that penguins predate puffins, which is a matter of contingent semantic fact. The 
equivalences between ‘Penguins predate puffins’ and (B) and (C) appear to be stronger. In my 
view, the equivalence with (C) is the strongest. (B) appears to be about a proposition, unlike 
‘Penguins predate puffins’, which is about birds. Given that (C) isn’t obviously about a proposition 
either (note that it involves a truth operator rather than a predicate), I believe that it is closest in 
content to the original. This point is disputable—one might take (B) and (C) to be stylistic variants 
of each other (e.g., Moltmann 2021: S711). But even if (C) is no closer to the original than (B), it 
still has claim to being the alethic counterpart closest to ‘Penguins predate puffins’, and so I focus 
on it below. Nihilism, of course, denies that there is any equivalence at all between ‘Penguins 
predate puffins’ and any of (A), (B), and (C); nihilists accept the former but reject all of the latter. 
Next, there are different perspectives one might have on the equivalence between ‘p’ and 
‘It’s true that p’. I shall consider two. First is the strong view that these two are “cognitively 
equivalent” (e.g., Field 1994), or express the same proposition (e.g., Frege 1956: 293 and Asay 




different ways of saying the same thing. Second is the moderate view that these are cognitively and 
conceptually distinct, but metaphysically equivalent. On this view, there may be extra content 
added by way of the truth ascription, but this content is not such as to make it metaphysically 
possible for one to obtain but not the other. This view is embraced by some deflationists (e.g., 
Horwich 1998: 128) but also substantivists about truth, whose theories provide robust accounts 
of the nature of the truth property being ascribed. If there is a weak view out there, it would be the 
nihilist’s, which denies that there is any equivalence at all. 
It’s straightforward to demonstrate how the strong view yields the conclusion that the 
nihilist has changed the subject. According to this view, ‘p’ and ‘It’s true that p’ are cognitively 
equivalent. There is no chasm to be bridged between the two: to deny one but not the other is like 
accepting that snow is white, but not that Schnee ist weiß. Because the nihilist accepts that snow 
is white, and accepting that snow is white just is accepting that it’s true that snow is white, then if 
they do succeed in denying something by uttering ‘It’s not true that snow is white’, they must be 
denying something else, on pain of outright contradiction. 
For the moderate view, the case can’t rely on an equivalence in meaning between ‘p’ and 
‘It’s true that p’. The relationship between the two is more akin to that between, say, ‘This glass is 
full of water’ and ‘This glass is full of H2O’. The claims are metaphysically equivalent in that it’s 
metaphysically impossible for one of them to obtain but not the other. Given that there is water, 
there must be H2O, even though ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ don’t have the same meaning. If this kind of 
equivalence is operant, then there is an easy way to make sense of how one can accept that there 
is water, but not H2O: one must reject the claim that water is H2O. (Perhaps one thinks that water 
is an element.) In the case of truth, the non-nihilist argues that a metaphysically sufficient condition 
for it being true that snow is white is just snow being white. (Substantivists and deflationists agree 
on this point, even if substantivists append a further story as to how the property of truth is to be 
analyzed.) Nihilists must tell a different story: they must give an account of what truth is such that 
snow being white is not a sufficient condition for it being true that snow is white, just like how the 
H2O denier must show that there being water is not a sufficient condition for there being H2O. 
The fact that the nihilist is obliged to give an account of what truth is (or, rather, would 
be) that rejects a simple platitude accepted by every other theory of truth is highly suggestive, again, 
that the nihilist has to switch topics in order to succeed. Consider Tarski’s contention that if a 
“definition of truth is to conform to our conception, it must imply” the T-biconditionals (1944: 343; 
emphasis added). For Eklund and Scharp, that snow is white is sufficient for it being true that 
snow is white is a constitutive principle of TRUTH, such that (at least on Scharp’s view) denying it 




According to Lynch, denying the platitudes about truth captured by the T-schema “would mean 
that you would be regarded by other users of the concept as changing the subject” (2009: 13). The 
point is that even if ‘p’ and ‘It’s true that p’ don’t exactly coincide in meaning, the bond between 
them is so strong that one can’t break it without raising the alarm of subject change. I don’t here 
offer a partisan theory as to what it is for the nihilist to have changed the subject in denying that 
truth exists. But it doesn’t matter: the nihilist provides fuel for that conclusion, regardless of how 
it should be understood. The nihilist rejects what are taken to be constitutive principles for TRUTH 
that give the word ‘true’ its meaning on some views. The nihilist rejects claims involving truth that 
are said to be analytic (true in virtue of meaning), by those who believe in analyticity. The nihilist 
rejects platitudes involving truth that constitute what we mean by ‘true’, at least in the eyes of 
Canberra planners. The nihilist engages in radically different inferential practices regarding ‘true’, 
for those who identify inferential role as the key factor when it comes to meaning. When the 
nihilist offers their account of what they mean by ‘truth’, it will be unrecognizable, irrespective of 
one’s background views about what constitutes meaning and subject change. 
Consider the following analogy. Suppose a philosopher claims to be a nihilist about 
bachelors: they deny that anything is a bachelor. Nevertheless, the bachelor nihilist firmly agrees 
that there are plenty of unmarried men. If one charges the bachelor nihilist with being inconsistent, 
the bachelor nihilist notes that they reject the inference from ‘x is an unmarried man’ to ‘x is a 
bachelor’. After all, the instances of the biconditional ‘x is a bachelor if and only if x is an unmarried 
man’ are to be rejected whenever ‘x’ is replaced by an unmarried man. For in that case the left-
hand side will be rejected (nothing is a bachelor) but the right-hand side upheld. Were we to 
encounter such a character, the appropriate response would be: whatever it is you think you’re 
denying when you deny that some unmarried man is a bachelor is not something that I understand. 
Given that you’ve granted that there are unmarried men, there are no remaining grounds for 
denying that there are bachelors. This is the case, irrespective of whether ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried 
man’ mean the same thing, or just refer to metaphysically equivalent properties. 
The burden facing the nihilist is that they must establish both that they are talking about 
what everybody else is talking about (on pain of having changed the subject), and also that 
everybody else is nevertheless wrong about what is involved in there being truth. The analog is the 
H2O denier who must convince others that they’re wrong to believe that water is H2O. Given the 
claims about truth that nihilists deny, it’s unclear on what basis they could establish that they do 
mean what the rest of us do when we talk about truth. They don’t just disagree with us about what 
is true (none of us agree about what’s true); they disagree with the very principles that we use to 




nihilism: what it is for something to be true is for it to be a magical witch that lives in Oklahoma. 
‘Snow is white’, like every other truth-bearer, is not a magical witch that lives in Oklahoma, and so 
fails to be true by this account. But this is a clear case of subject change: whatever it is that 
constitutes our shared discourse on truth, it has nothing to do with witches. The nihilist must say 
what truth is such that it remains recognizable, yet does not entail that things are true when they 
say that p and p. It’s not clear to me how one might go about giving an account of what truth is 
that somehow doesn’t also appeal to the T-biconditionals. 
More importantly, Liggins doesn’t offer one, either. Nonetheless, his writing is highly 
suggestive of an approach to truth that resembles Künne’s (2003) account that employs sentential 
quantification. When discussing ‘For all X and all P, if X knows P, then P is true’, Liggins notes 
that the nihilist must reject it, for although some things are known, nothing is true. But Liggins 
then claims: 
 
‘true’ functions here as a device of generalization. It serves to generalize 
 
  For all X, if X knows <Snow is white>, then snow is white.14 
 
And nihilists are free to make claims of this form. Indeed, they can assert a generalization 
of them, provided it does not use ‘true’. For instance, they can claim 
 
For all X and all p, if X knows <p>, then p. 
 
where the first quantifier is a familiar objectual one, but the second is a sentential quantifier. 
(2019: 16; italics added)15 
 
The question is why there is any need for the italicized proviso here. If the alethically-laden claim 
is just a generalization of acceptable claims, then it is equally acceptable. The purpose of invoking 
sentential quantification here is to show how one can dispense with ‘true’: it’s not adding any 
genuine content. Consider next Liggins’s other example: 
 
                                                 
14 ‘<p>’ abbreviates ‘the proposition that p’. 





Similarly, nihilists must deny that we should believe only truths; while we should make 
some assertions, there are (by their lights) no truths for us to believe. Nihilists think that 
‘We should only believe truths’ should be interpreted as a generalization of ‘We should 
believe that snow is white, only if snow is white’. They are free to make claims of this form, 
and to accept a ‘true’-free generalization of them: 
 
For all p, we should believe that p only if p. (2019: 16) 
 
Liggins takes himself to be showing how he can say—without using ‘true’—what others have said 
while using ‘true’. We begin with claims such as ‘We should believe that snow is white only if snow 
is white’. The non-nihilist generalizes to ‘For all p, we should believe that p only if <p> is true’. 
The nihilist generalizes to ‘For all p, we should believe that p only if p’. But the problem for Liggins 
is that he hasn’t explained in what way these two generalizations differ. Sure, one uses ‘true’ and 
the other doesn’t. But this just reveals that ‘true’ and sentential quantification are equally useful 
tools for constructing generalizations. Philosophers such as Horwich doubt that sentential 
quantification is acceptable, and thus praise ‘true’ instead for its generalizing ability.16 Philosophers 
such as Künne find sentential quantification acceptable, and use it to define truth. What is idiosyncratic 
about Liggins’s view is that it finds sentential quantification acceptable, and yet doesn’t 
acknowledge that it renders commitments to truth all but inevitable. 
A further problem for Liggins is that by embracing sentential quantification, he commits 
himself to the existence of truth (at least by everyone else’s lights). Consider Künne’s “modest” 
theory of truth that deploys sentential quantification. According to Künne, for some x to be true 
is for there to be some p such that x is (or expresses) the proposition that p and p (2003: 337). All 
the quantification here is objectual, though ‘x’ is nominal (to be replaced by a name of the value 
of the variable) and ‘p’ is sentential (to be replaced by a sentence that expresses the value of the 
variable). Because he embraces sentential quantification, Liggins may assert that there is a p such 
that ‘Snow is white’ expresses the proposition that p and p. But that’s all there is to ‘Snow is white’ 
                                                 
16 More precisely, Horwich stresses the inadequacy of appealing to substitutional quantification in one’s theory of truth, 
and doesn’t consider the possibility of a sentential quantifier. But what he says about the former applies just as well to 
the latter: “The advantage of the truth predicate is that it allows us to say what we want without having to employ any 
new linguistic apparatus of this sort. It enables us to achieve the effect of generalizing substitutionally over sentences 
and predicates, but by means of ordinary variables (i.e. pronouns), which range over objects” (1998: 4, note 1). He 
would apply this idea to sentential quantification: why develop an unfamiliar form of quantification to serve a purpose 




being true, according to the modest view. Furthermore, any non-nihilist (who accepts the 
legitimacy of sentential quantification) accepts that there being a p such that ‘Snow is white’ 
expresses the proposition that p and p is at least a sufficient condition on ‘Snow is white’ being true, 
even if it doesn’t fully capture the nature of truth. 
Just as he denies half of the T-biconditionals, Liggins must deny half of the “Künne-
biconditionals” such as: 
 
‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if there is some p such that ‘Snow is white’ expresses the 
proposition that p and p. 
 
So Liggins cannot appeal to Künne’s account of truth. Hence, Liggins still owes us a recognizable 
account of what it takes to be true such that ‘Snow is white’ fails to have it, despite snow being 
white. Such an account is necessary to justify the separation that Liggins detects between 
 




(B) For all X and all p, if X knows <p>, then p. 
 
Theorists who appeal to the sentential quantification in (B) do so in order to show how one can 
say what one says with (A) without using the truth predicate. But these theorists would accept that 
(A) and (B) are equivalent, because ‘true’ in (A)—as even Liggins acknowledges—“functions here 
as a device of generalization” (2019: 16). Liggins must insist that they are not equivalent (although 
he still needs to maintain that at least in some sense (B) captures what (A) is after), but he can only 
do that by supplying some account of what else is needed for truth that has somehow gone missing. 
One might have thought that he could avail himself of Künne’s account, given his embrace of 
sentential quantification, but he must reject it just as he must reject all extant theories of truth, 
since they all accept that snow being white is a sufficient condition for there being truth. 
To sum up, the challenge facing Liggins is how to demonstrate that when he claims to be 
denying the existence of truth, he is genuinely denying the existence of what non-nihilists embrace. 
Given that Liggins rejects the very claims that other theorists would point to in their account of 
what truth (or the concept TRUTH) is, or what ‘true’ means, etc., this challenge is especially pressing. 




for there being truth. Liggins owes us a recognizable account of truth—one that validates the claim 
that he hasn’t changed the subject—that reveals how the world doesn’t, in fact, provide the 
necessary ingredients for there being truth. 
 
3 Against alethic nihilism 
 The main plank in the defense of alethic nihilism is its response to the liar paradox. But 
Liggins offers other points of support. However, I believe that these considerations are not 




One further defense that Liggins offers is a parsimony consideration: 
 
once we see that we speak as if some things are true just in order to enhance our expressive 
capacities, there is no longer any motivation for positing truths. Adding the claim that there 
are truths is to add a claim that does no explanatory work… compared with those theories 
which say that some things are true, nihilism portrays the world as a simpler place. (2019: 
21) 
 
The simplicity claimed here is an illusion. First, note that the nihilist enjoys no immediate ontological 
advantage. The denial that there are truths is not driven by a denial that there are truth-bearers. 
Though Liggins has his own suspicions about propositions (2019: 23), their existence is consistent 
with nihilism, so long as no proposition is held to be true. Moreover, Liggins gives no indication 
that he disbelieves in the existence of the sentence ‘Snow is white’, or my belief that snow is white. 
So the nihilist and non-nihilist can agree that the sentence ‘Snow is white’ exists, that my belief 
that snow is white exists, and that snow is white. The only disagreement here is whether or not the 
belief and the sentence are true. There’s no room for an ontological advantage on either side. You 
and I might disagree over whether Fred is a weaver, but if you deny it while I uphold it, neither of 
our views is thereby more ontologically parsimonious if we both believe in Fred. We all have the 
same things in our ontology. 
The nihilist might respond by claiming ontological parsimony by way of not having to 
posit a property of truth. Though the nihilist scores no parsimony points via positing fewer entities, 
they do via positing fewer properties. This advantage is illusory as well. For one thing, parsimony 




relevant parsimony considerations that involve abundant properties. As Lewis points out, 
“Properties carve reality at the joints—and everywhere else as well” (1983: 346). Being green is just 
as much a property as is being grue. Some properties might be “special”—they might carve reality 
at the joints, or correspond to universals, or what have you. And perhaps theories that posit fewer 
special (i.e., sparse) properties are more advantageous in terms of parsimony. But that factor is not 
operant with alethic nihilism. Being true is not a sparse property. My belief that snow is white is true 
not because the belief has a particular property (truth), but because snow has a particular property, 
namely, whiteness. The parsimony-relevant issue is whether or not the nihilist or non-nihilist has 
a better argument for truth being merely abundant. But the non-nihilist, like everyone else, has 
every reason to think that truth is a merely abundant property.17 
So contrary to Liggins’s account, the nihilist’s world is not simpler. They deny that my 
belief that snow is white is true, but they agree that the belief exists, and that snow is white. Given 
that all it takes for that belief to be true is for snow to be white, there is no gain in parsimony by 
denying that the belief has the property of truth. The supposed advantage the nihilist sees is a case 
of “false parsimony”, to borrow a phrase from Thomasson (1999): given that the nihilist accepts 
all the “ingredients” for truth, there is no gain in parsimony by denying what those ingredients add 
up to. One who acknowledges the existence of unmarried men but denies the existence of 
bachelors likewise doesn’t thereby adopt a simpler worldview, “a world without bachelors”. They 
just instead, falsely, and with no regard to the meaning of the word, empty the extension of 
‘bachelor’, insisting that everything is a non-bachelor. 
 
3.2 Epistemology 
Another argument that Liggins offers in defense of nihilism concerns the epistemology of 
the T-biconditionals and semantically ascended claims (2019: 22). As Liggins acknowledges, 
nihilism severely diverges from ordinary belief and its commitment to things being true. But he 
doesn’t take that fact as itself a reason to resist nihilism; instead, he suggests that philosophical 
theories conflicting with common knowledge is what’s problematic. And non-nihilists, Liggins 
claims, don’t have a good explanation for how we could have this supposed knowledge of the T-
biconditionals and semantically ascended claims. So there is not obviously any bit of uncontentious 
knowledge that nihilists are denying. 
Consider first how the nihilist approaches the epistemology of T-biconditionals. We know, 
in the usual way, that snow is white. We know, in the usual way, that grass isn’t purple. Nihilism 
                                                 




tells us that neither ‘Snow is white’ nor ‘Grass is purple’ is true. From all this we can conclude (by 
relying on our knowledge of how biconditionals work) that it’s not the case that ‘Snow is white’ is 
true if and only if snow is white, and is the case that ‘Grass is purple’ is true if and only if grass is 
purple. Here, the ability to have knowledge of the T-biconditionals’ acceptability or unacceptability 
rests on one’s prior knowledge of nihilism, as it’s a crucial premise in determining the status of the 
biconditionals. So knowledge of the T-biconditionals rests on antecedent knowledge about the 
world, logic, and nihilism itself. A question I’ll return to later is whether there is any independent 
evidence in favor of nihilism. 
As for the non-nihilist, Liggins suspects that knowledge with respect to truth is 
problematic. There’s no special epistemological difficulty for coming to know that snow is white. 
What Liggins does take to be of special difficulty is explaining how one can come to know that 
the proposition <Snow is white> is true. He writes: “There is no plausible perceptual account of 
our knowledge of the truth of propositions, since propositions cannot be seen or otherwise sensed. 
And it is hard to think of any other way to come to know that a proposition is 
 true, if we leave aside the T-biconditionals” (2019: 22). We can deduce that <Snow is white> is 
true if we infer it from ‘Snow is white’ together with its T-biconditional ‘<Snow is white> is true 
if and only if snow is white’, but that brings into focus the question of how one comes to know 
the T-biconditional. Liggins says that the evidence for it can’t be empirical; but giving a non-
empirical account is “fraught with difficulties” (2019: 22). So there is no good epistemology for 
the T-biconditionals, and so there is no strong case for there being common knowledge of them 
that the nihilist must contradict. 
There are a number of places to dispute Liggins’s argument. First, it seems to me that there 
is a clear-cut empirical route to the truth of propositions (or at least those propositions that involve 
empirical matters of fact). The very same empirical evidence that provides me knowledge that 
snow is white provides me knowledge that <Snow is white> is true. There’s nothing more to 
knowing that a proposition is true than knowing that its content obtains. As we have seen, the 
nihilist must find a massive gulf between claims that p and claims that it’s true that p, such that one 
can accept one but deny the other. But there is no basis for finding such a gulf that respects what 
it means to say that something is true. Liggins might say that my argument here presupposes the 
T-biconditional in question: I “rely” on it to establish my “nothing more” claim regarding ‘<p> is 
true’ vs. ‘p’. But I don’t think that captures the phenomenon correctly. As a competent user of the 
linguistic vehicle ‘Snow is white’, I know how to approach it epistemologically. I need to do some 
visual investigation (or rely on others who have done such investigation). Liggins doesn’t dispute 




that same competency with English also gives me a decent epistemology for ‘<Snow is white> is 
true’, and that competency reveals that it doesn’t involve any special epistemology.18 
As for the T-biconditionals, how we come to know them depends on which version we’re 
talking about. A sentential T-biconditional such as ‘‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is 
white’ is empirical in just the way that ‘‘Schnee ist weiß’ is true if and only if snow is white’ is; they 
both turn on empirical facts about what certain marks mean. Propositional T-biconditionals such 
as ‘<Snow is white> is true if and only if snow is white’ are not obviously empirical. They are 
typically regarded as being necessarily the case; <Snow is white> is just the content expressed by 
‘Snow is white’. 
In any event, what ultimately explains the epistemology of T-biconditionals is the fact that 
anything that means that p (or is a meaning that p, as one might think regarding propositions) is 
true if and only if p. Liggins might query as to how we know that, and would reject responses that 
appeal to concept possession or “competency” as I just did. These paths are fraught with difficulty. 
So be it, but it’s not clear that this is dialectically relevant. Explaining knowledge in the 
neighborhood of the a priori, analyticity, and the like is an ancient, puzzling, and difficult 
philosophical topic. But it poses no special problem for the non-nihilist. Liggins needs to show 
that we have good reason to doubt that we have knowledge of the T-biconditionals; then he could 
maintain that his view doesn’t contradict any commonly acceptable claims to knowledge. The fact 
that one doesn’t have a thoroughgoing epistemology for a set of claims doesn’t show that one has 
reason to doubt that one knows them. It just shows that epistemology is difficult. 
Consider again the bachelor nihilist, who claims that while there are unmarried men, there 
are no bachelors. This nihilist rejects the claim that someone is a bachelor if and only if they are 
an unmarried man. ‘How would one know such a biconditional?’, they might ask. Possession of 
the concept BACHELOR might explain why they believe the biconditional, but it wouldn’t by itself 
prove that bachelors are unmarried men. That such a character exists, however, wouldn’t 
undermine my knowledge that bachelors are unmarried men. We might also ask the bachelor 
nihilist to consider claims they make that rely on knowledge they might find hard to justify. For 
example, the bachelor nihilist denies the biconditional ‘Harry is a bachelor if and only if Harry is 
                                                 
18 One might, of course, raise epistemological concerns with respect to the existence of propositions, because of their 
abstract nature. Liggins suggests in a footnote that propositions per se aren’t the issue here, and that parallel 
epistemological concerns arise for sentence types (2019: 22). But I don’t see how there is an issue for sentence tokens 
or beliefs or statements. And anyway, concerns about the ontology of various abstract entities is not in and of itself a 
concern about truth, or reason to doubt that it exists. To my mind, they motivate ontologically deflationary accounts 




an unmarried male’ because while they accept that Harry is an unmarried male, their bachelor 
nihilism forces them to deny that Harry is a bachelor. This bit of reasoning relies on the principle 
that biconditionals are to be rejected when one of their conditions is accepted and its other 
condition rejected. Where does knowledge of such principles come from? That’s a difficult 
question to answer—especially when the familiar answers are all rejected as being fraught—but it 
shouldn’t bring philosophical inquiry to a standstill. 
Ultimately, the point is that the alethic nihilist and non-nihilist are both steeped in 
reasoning that is non-empirical, potentially a priori, and that presumably turns on linguistic 
competence, conceptual possession, and secure logical inference. All philosophical argument is. 
The epistemology of this terrain is fraught, but it doesn’t paralyze inquiry. Nor should the 
skepticism be deployed selectively: concern for how we know T-biconditionals isn’t any more 
fraught than how we know claims like ‘Biconditionals are acceptable if both conditions are 
acceptable’.  
 
3.3 Ad hocery 
Here is one final objection against the nihilist. It perhaps preaches to the choir, as the 
nihilist will claim that it begs the question. Nevertheless, it draws attention to a greater dialectical 
concern for nihilism.  Liggins points out that the nihilist can derive various claims about truth, 
such as ‘For every proposition P, if P is true then P’s self-conjunction is true’ (2019: 20). This is 
just another “vacuous” claim for the nihilist, as it employs an empty antecedent. Still, the nihilist 
need not deny it. This same mechanism, however, saddles the nihilist with all sorts of commitments 
that no one should want. For example, although the nihilist may assert that all truths ought to be 
believed, they are also committed to the claim that all falsehoods ought to be believed. (Nihilism 
about truth entails nihilism about falsehood.) Nihilists must concede that if it’s true that snow is 
white, then Hegel’s writing is a paradigm of clarity. Nihilists accept that all falsehoods are 
knowable. But of course (say I), it’s not the case that all falsehoods are knowable. 
As noted, the nihilist accepts these consequences; these commitments that no one else 
would dare accept are not dealbreakers for nihilists. They are symptoms of the fact that the concept 
of truth is deeply entrenched in our conceptual scheme—an unfortunate fact, according to the 
nihilist, but a fact nonetheless. But it must be noted that there is no other reason to believe any of 
these claims, beyond the fact that they follow from nihilism. That in turn puts enormous dialectical 
pressure on the initial thesis of nihilism itself. Given that it entails countless commitments that we 
have no other reason to believe, there needs to be significant reason to believe nihilism in the first 




basis for believing nihilism rests entirely on its response to the liar paradox. This fact provides the 
grounds for my final objection. 
Liggins identifies as a restrictionist, where restrictionism is the view that rejects some of 
the T-biconditionals, thereby “restricting” the scope of the T-schema. Mainstream deflationists 
like Horwich reject only the T-biconditionals that lead to paradox (1998: 40-42). Critics then charge 
them with being ad hoc, as rejecting the biconditionals only because doing so enables them to dodge 
the paradox (e.g., Beall & Armour-Garb 2003). Liggins claims that his restrictionism, by contrast, 
is principled: “the nihilist’s rejection of half of the T-biconditionals is principled: as we have seen, 
nihilism entails the negation of these biconditionals. Their rejection is motivated not by the desire 
to escape paradox but by the conviction that nothing is true” (2019: 20). The concern with being 
ad hoc is that in order to solve a philosophical problem (the liar paradox), one adopts a philosophical 
view (restrictionism) that is motivated only by its ability to answer the problem. But Liggins is open 
to this sort of critique: the main motivation (and the only tenable motivation, I’ve argued) for 
accepting alethic nihilism is its ability to answer the liar paradox. In response, Liggins here seems 
to sever the motivational connection between the Liar and nihilism. Liggins’s nihilism is said not 
to be motivated by its solution to the Liar. The conviction in nihilism comes first; the restrictionism 
that follows (and the response to the Liar it makes available) is a happy downstream consequence. 
Hence, Liggins avoids the charge of being ad hoc that less extreme restrictionists face at the expense 
of giving up any motivational basis at all for alethic nihilism. But what reason could there be for 
believing that nothing is true, save for the liar paradox? Without an answer to that question, 




Alethic nihilism is a radical philosophical view, and Liggins is correct to argue that this 
status does not make it unworthy of philosophical consideration. Crucial to its defense, however, 
is showing that it’s not self-refuting, as philosophers across millennia have taken it to be. The 
nihilist does have a defense, but I believe it turns on imposing more substance onto the property 
of truth than anyone should. The last century of work on truth has aimed at showing that the 
notion of truth is actually metaphysically anodyne; those who balk at the existence of truth (like 
the early-to-middle Nietzsche, or figures like Rorty) are fighting against an illusory opponent. The 
contemporary nihilist appreciates the progress in the theory of truth, and sees truth’s 
fundamentally expressive raison dêtre as grounds for denying that truths exist. What I have pressed 




all but inevitable. Because there’s nothing more to believing in truth than believing anything at all, 
the logical space for a view like alethic nihilism is intolerably narrow. 
The fact that something is true is, as most have thought all along, inevitable. There remains 
the question of how to solve the liar paradox, and I have said nothing to motivate any alternative 
approach. But I do hope to have lessened the recent enthusiasm for the family of views that hope 
to solve the paradox by arguing that truth is non-existent, or that the concept TRUTH is 
inconsistent. For the latter view entails the former, and the former is independently unsustainable. 
The paradoxes remain a puzzle, but they have hardly proven that nothing is true.19 
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